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1Introduction
This paper aims at establishing links between the Austrian theory of the market process and the
theory of economic organization. Others have also explored this link, focusing on, for
example, the contribution of Mises’ (1936, 1949) analysis of economic calculation to the
understanding of the firm’s boundaries (Klein 1996) or on how Hayek’s insights in dispersed
knowledge furthers our understanding of the large firm’s internal organization (Jensen and
Meckling 1992).  However, our perspective is different from these contributions.
Specifically, we begin from the Austrian notion of the market process as not only a superior
method of integrating dispersed knowledge, but also of producing new knowledge (novelties).
One of the reasons for this superiority lies in the experimental nature of the market process:
Experiments in products, processes, organization, etc. are continuously being conducted and
evaluated. Alienable property rights allow local decision-makers to carry out such
experiments, to a large extent without seeking anybody’s approval. It is this overall
experimental view that we wish to transfer to the firm; thus, we consider a new locus for
experimental activity.
Firms play a central and even dominant role in the process of economic experimenting as
inventing and innovating teams − a fact that is reflected in neither Austrian economics, nor in
the mainstream economics of organization.  However, our point is that a perspective on firms
as experimenting teams not only furthers our understanding of the dynamics of the market
process, it also allows us to develop a novel perspective on the firm.
Novelties are brought forward by firms, and are tested in the experimental procedure of the
market process.  For example, novelties may become embodied in new products and enter
into the market process in the form of transactions with consumers or industrial users.
However, prior to this injection into the market process, novelties have been produced inside
the firm, or, perhaps, in cooperation with two or more firms.  These processes also involve
transactions, or, more precisely, the exchange of property rights, between various agents.  As
an enormous literature informs us of, the definition, exchange and enforcement of property
rights is not costless, the relevant costs being transaction costs. Therefore, performing
economic experiments is costly, not only in terms of direct outlays (R&D expenses, etc.), or
in the form of possible parallel experimentation, but also in terms of transaction costs.
2Focusing on these costs and on how they are influenced and influence economic
experiments allows us to address issues of economic organization. Thus, we look more
closely into the mechanisms inside firms that endogenously produce change, such as learning,
experimenting, and increasing division of labor, and tie this to issue of coordination by
managerial allocation of rights inside the firm.  We argue that the firm arises as an institution
that coordinates a complex division of labor in a technological system, characterized by
ongoing, endogenous change. Our discussion contributes to at least two areas of research.
First, we contribute to Austrian economics by arguing that the characteristically Austrian
emphasis on catallactic activity as often experimental in nature may be extended to the firm.
Second, we contribute to the economics of organization by incorporating issues of learning and
experimentation into this body of theory.
Economic Experiments and the Market Process
Many scholars have, in different ways and from very different positions, suggested that the
metaphor of experimentation is a useful way to characterize market activity.1  Thus, Nelson
and Winter (1982) base their evolutionary theory on the notion that “… the market system is
(in part) a device for conducting and evaluating experiments in economic behavior and
organization” (Nelson and Winter 1982: 277).2  In a somewhat broader context, namely that
of political philosophy, open’ness to experiments in rules, organization, lifestyles, etc. has
been one of the traditional arguments in favor of the liberal (“great”, “open”) society at least
since the writings of John Stuart Mill.  And a number of economic historians (e.g.,
Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986) have argued that “… the freedom to undertake …
experiments has been the essential element accounting for the fact that industrialization has
been, uniquely, a historical product of capitalist societies” (Rosenberg 1992: 181).   Finally,
it has been argued the basic problem facing public policy is the “…design of institutional
arrangements that provide incentives to encourage experimentation … without overly
insulating these experiments from the ultimate test of survival” (Demsetz 1969: 19). The
property rights system plays the key role here (North 1990).
                                                
1
 In spite of the connotations to closed-system conditions in natural science that the word carries with it
(Bhaskar 1978).
2
 These include Schumpeter (1911, 1943),  Mises (1936, 1949), Hayek (1946, 1978), Alchian (1950),
O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985), Pelikan (1988), Eliasson (1990), Loasby (1991), Rosenberg (1992) and Harper
(1996).
3However, it is somewhat unclear what is actually meant by saying that the market process is
one of continuous experimental activity.  To clear up this is important because, as a general
matter, an experiment may be a completely unpredictable “voyage of exploration into the
unknown” (Hayek 1946: 101) at the one extreme. Or, it may be of the completely controlled
kind where the purpose of the experiment is merely to confirm once more an already well-
established conjecture (Bhaskar 1978) at the other extreme. In fact, Bayesian sampling of
information may in a generous interpretation be seen as experimenting.3  Thus, some types
of experimental acitivty may be completely consistent with mainstream economics while
others are only consistent with Austrian or radical subjectivist approaches. And some types
of experiments may require firm organization while others don’t.
Experimental Activity in the Market Process
A step towards clarifying this is provided by Littlechild’s (1986) discussion of “three types of
market process”. Specifically, he (1986: 27) suggests that we distinguish between “ideal type”
models of the market process based on
... how the decision makers perceive of the world, how these perceptions change
over time, how these additional information may be sought, and how the decision
maker can limit his exposure to uncertainty.
This leads Littlechild to identify three ideal typical models, namely what he calls the
“neoclassical model” (e.g., Frydman 1982), the “Austrian model” (e.g., Kirzner 1973, 1992,
1997; High 1986) and the “radical subjectivist model” (e.g., Shackle 1972; Lachmann 1986;
Loasby 1976, 1991; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985). All three in principle make room for
experimental activity, albeit of different varieties.
This may become clearer if we also consider Kirzner’s (1997) distinction between two ways of
portraying ignorance in economic analysis. First, mainstream models of the asymmetric
information variety essentially posit that while agents are ignorant about certain things, they
know precisely the extent of their ignorance and can take steps, for example, through search
activities, to remedy this ignorance.  For example, an agent may conjecture that search for a
certain price of a certain good in a certain geographical area is warranted in the sense that the
expected benefit is larger than the expected search costs, and that conjecture may be borne out
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  See Cyert and Kumar (1996) for this interpretation.
4by actual events. This might be thought of as in a limited sense experimental activity.
Similarly, perhaps stretching the word too far, we might think of risk-bearing behavior as
broadly experimental.4
Second, there is also the distinct possibility that agents are actually ignorant about what they
are ignorant about. In Kirzner’s work, this ignorance is seen as being remedied by spontaneous
discovery. This would seem to leave experimental activity out of consideration because setting
up and conducting an experiment is a purposeful testing of a conjecture with an uncertain
outcome and not a spontaneous discovery. However, we may think of experimental activity as
one way in which agents reduce the ignorance that they are initially unaware of, for example,
through serendipitious discoveries.  Moreover, introducing uncertainty into the activities of the
Kirznerian entrepreneur remedies the problem: if the entrepreneur’s activities may be seen as
uncertain conjectures about arbitrage possibilities, then surely these activities too may be
characterized as experimental.
While Kirzner’s distinction clearly covers what Littlechild (1986) characterizes as the
neoclassical and the Austrian model, it is less clear how it relates to the radical subjectivist
model; in fact, it would seem to apply only to some extent.  Clearly, in the radical subjectivist
model, agents are exposed to surprises (Shackle 1972).  This implies that they are ignorant
about their own ignorance, otherwise genuine surprises could not take place.  On the other
hand, the radical subjectivist model stresses imagination, the ability to construct the choice set,
and the subsequent testing of choices in the market process (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985).  It is
a view that is perhaps in greater conformity with the conventional understanding of
experimentation than the two other views. However, all three captures some aspects of
experimental activity.  We may sum up these insights in the table below.5
                   
                                                
4
  A relevant consideration in this connection is whether information about a risky event is generally shared or
not. Thus, risk-taking behavior when there is substantial disagreement about the probability of the occurrence
of a certain event (and it is therefore hard to insure against) is more deserving of being called experimental
than when there is agreement on the probability (and the event is therefore easily insurable).
5
  The quotations in the table are from Littlechild (1986: 24).
5TABLE 1
                                                                Models of the market process
Neoclassical Austrian Radical subjectivist
Characterization of
the future
The agent can fully
characterize the vector of
variables that is relevant
for his actions and can
fully characterize the
proba-bility distributions
of these variables.
The future “… is a vector
of which the agent knows
some components but not
others”.
The future “… is not so
much unknown as it is
non-existent or indeter-
minate at the time of
decision.  The agents task
is not to estimate or
discover, but to create”
Agents’ know-ledge Agents know what they
don’t know.  Ignorance is
reduced through search.
Agents don’t know what
they don’t know.
Ignorance is reduced
through spontaneous
discovery.
Same as in Austrian
model. Knowledge is
inherently conjectural.
Economic
experimentation
Reduction of known
ignorance; Bayesian
updating of priors; risk-
bearing.
A means to foster
spontaneous disco-very.
A result of imagina-tion:
a test of a bold
conjecture.
As the table reveals, any sort of forward-looking and risky decision-making may be broadly
characterized as experimental.  However, in order to focus the discussion, we shall in the
following associate experimental activity with choice situations characterized by a high
degree of imperfection of knowledge about the future, and therefore a state of uncertainty
that is deeper than what is normally assumed in mainstream economics. Thus, the
conventional search model does not in this view portray experimental behavior. In our view,
agents may still hold subjective probabilities about the outcomes of events. However, the
key point is that when we are talking about experimental activity proper, what is involved
are events about which disseminated knowledge is not present in the market.
Introducing a new product (rather than a product variation), a new process of production, or
a new type of organization (e.g., Dupont’s introduction of the M-form after First World War
(Chandler 1962)) are instances of commercial experimental activity.  In contrast, if what is
involved are events that are well-understood (in terms of causal connections and possibly
even probability distributions), we shall not – in our terminology -- be dealing with
experimental activity proper.
6Implications for Economic Organization
There are some − but not many − hints scattered in the economics of organization that
experimentation and economic organization are related issues.  Thus, Knight (1921) stressed
the forward-looking, conjectural nature of entrepreneurial activity and tied this to both the
existence of profit and the nature of the firm. In Knight’s view, the entrepreneur’s
conjectures are so much clouded by uncertainty and so much inside the entrepreneur’s own
head that they cannot be communicated to other agents or insured.  In order to capture profit
from his commercial conjecture, the entrepreneur has to set up a firm with himself in the
position of residual claimant.  Thus, a combination of communication costs (Foss 1993) and
moral hazard (Barzel 1987) explains both the firm and profit as a residual income category
in Knight’s view.  This is one way of linking economic organization and commercial
experimentation in the marketplace.
In his discussion of the “Nature of the Firm”, Coase (1937) implicitly establishes a second
link. As Coase (1937) observes, it is “... improbable that a firm would emerge without the
existence of uncertainty”, and it is clear from the context that he has Knightian uncertainty in
mind.  In an often quoted passage, Coase (1937: 21) notes that
It may be desired to make a long-term contract for the supply of some article or
service ... Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of the
contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible, and
indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify what the other
contracting party is expected to do ... Therefore, the service which is being
provided is expressed in general terms, the exact details being left until a later date
... When the direction of resources ... becomes dependent on the buyer in this way,
that relationship which I term a “firm” may be obtained.
While there is nothing in Coase’s discussion to suggest that he had experimentation in mind,
we shall suggest that one benefit of the combination of hierarchical direction and the
incomplete employment contract is that this eases the conducting of experiments inside the
firm (e.g., with new technologies or organization structures) (see also Loasby 1991).  More
generally, the property rights structure that characterizes the firm may crucially reflect not only
the desire to conduct commercial experiments but also a desire to safeguard against uncertainty
7and its consequences.6   In order to develop this view of the firm, we shall rely on property
rights economics (e.g., Barzel 1997).
An Experimental View of the Firm
In this section we develop an experimental view of the firm. Our argument is based on a
combination of insights about the economic implications of property rights and Austrian and
radical subjectivist insights into imagination and entrepreneurial discovery. On this basis,
we shall seek a rationale for firm organization in the superior ability to conduct commercial
experiments that firms may have relative to markets.
Property Rights
At first glance, the property rights approach (Alchian, 1965; Barzel, 1989; Coase, 1960;
Demsetz, 1964, 1969; Eggertson, 1990; Libecap, 1989; North, 1990) seems at variance with
Austrian economics.7  In fact, some parts of the approach, such as (certain interpretations of)
the Coase theorem, have been criticized by Austrian economists (e.g., Kirzner 1973: 226-7).
However, what may be objectionable in the property rights approach from an Austrian point
of view are not the specific analytical categories developed within this approach per se.  In
fact, Austrians have for a long time devoted interest to the category of property and its
economic implications (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk 1881; Mises 1936).8   
Conventionally, property rights include use rights, which define the potential uses of an
asset; income rights, or the right to consume an asset; rights to exclude non-owners from
access to assets, and rights to transfer permanently to another party all the above mentioned
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 Littlechild (1986: 35) suggested something similar when he argued that “... ownership of a resource reduces
exposure to unexpected events.  Property rights are a means of reducing uncertainty without needing to know
precisely what the source or nature of the future concern will be”, and this overall insight can arguably be
found in much of the modern theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995; Williamson 1996).
7
  Note that we primarily refer to the “older” property rights approach of Coase, Alchian, Demsetz, Barzel, etc.
rather than to the more recent property rights approach that has been developed by Oliver Hart and various
colleagues (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990).   For an argument that these are two
different approaches and that older approach is some important dimensions superior to the more recent one,
see Foss and Foss (1999).
8
 The aspects that an Austrian may object to are rather the assumptions in the approach that agents always seek to
maximize the value of the rights they control and that the process of exchanging rights can be represented in
terms of equilibrium. Indeed, at least one writer (Eggertson 1990) characterizes the approach as “generalized
neoclassical economics”.  But Austrians should not have problems with the basic notion that property rights are
the rights people hold over assets.
8rights over an asset − that is to alienate or sell an assets.  Barzel (1994: 394) provides a
convenient summing-up of the economic concept of property rights “... as an individual’s
net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of the asset,
or to consume it indirectly through exhange. A key word is ability: The definition is
concerned not with what people are legally entitled to do but with what they believe they can
do”.9
Because property rights define the relationships among individuals with respect to scarce
assets, they are social institutions.  However, it is important to observe that property rights
systems may exist at several levels (among which there are hierarchical relations).  Thus, the
law, norms and mores of society define and delimit the range of privileges granted to
individuals to assets.  The combination of property rights and their institutional support is a
“property rights system”.  However, property rights systems also exist on lower levels than
the societal level, notably inside firms (Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986; Barzel
1997). Thus, the system of property rights existing in a firm refers to the set of relations that
define the position of each agent with respect to other agents and with respect to the assets
with which the team works (Alchian 1984).
Historically, the property rights approach emerged from the insight that what is exchanged
are not assets per se, but rather the rights to those assets (Coase, 1960; Alchian 1965).
However, the exchange of rights is not costless. For example, often physical and human
assets have different properties and may sometimes yield a number of different services
depending on how the assets are used.  In principle, each one of the properties and different
uses of assets can be specified and be subject to negotiations between parties to a
transaction.  Moreover, use rights over different properties or uses of assets may be shared
between individuals (Barzel, 1997).  To specify and to contract over the different possible
uses of assets are clearly costly actions − more precisely, they involve transaction costs.  In
the property rights framework, transaction costs are conceptualized as the costs due to the
transfer, capture and protection of rights (Barzel 1997: 2).  When such costs exist, not
everything will be specified in contracts – they are left incomplete.
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 This, we note in passing is completely consistent with Mises’ point that ownership refers to “the power to use
economic goods”, that “… ownership is the having of the goods which the economic aims of men require”,
and that “… the economic significance of the legal should have lies only in the support it lends to the
acquisition, the maintenance and the regaining of the natural having” (Mises 1936: 27).
9Changing Property Rights
While property rights theorists have done much to clarify the meanings and ramifications of
property they have done comparatively little to clarify why systems of property rights change
over time, although some historical evidence has been brought to bear on this issue
(Demsetz 1964; North 1990).  How systems of property rights change have also been a
neglected issue, because of the underlying comparative-static method in the property rights
approach.10
Our response to these difficulties begins from the observation that the two issues of why and
how property rights change are twin issues. Thus, from an Austrian perspective property
rights change because of entrepreneurial alertness11; alert entrepreneurs may discover that
some rearrangement of existing property rights or some capture of rights that are in the
public domain increase their own utility. Clearly, this is an extension of the Kirznerian view
of the entrepreneur (Kirzner 1973, 1992, 1997). Kirzner tends to take the property rights
structure as given, and inquire into the arbitrage activities that alert entrepreneurs pursue
inside this structure.  However, in our view the concept of entrepreneurial discovery should
be broadened to also encompass discoveries related to re-definitions and capture of property
rights, and not just to the exchange of these.
It is this augmented entrepreneurial perspective that we apply to firms.  In our view, firms
are prime vehicles for entrepreneurial experimentation with products and processes because
the property rights systems that characterize firms often allows this experimentation to be
carried out at lower costs than in markets. Moreover, and what we shall focus on in the
following, firms are also vehicles for experimentation with property rights structures
themselves. Organizational changes -- such as outsourcing, changes in organizational
structure, team-based management, etc. -- are thus experiments with the property rights
structures of firms.  But so are the more mundane trials and errors involved in setting up a
smoothly running production system consisting of many interdependent specialized tasks,
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 In Demsetz’ (1967) famous example of how property rights changed among …. indians,  the process of
change itself is thus a black box.
11
 In the political realm, this process of entrepreneurs influencing the definition of property rights is of course
known as “rent-seeking”.  The concept has also been applied to firms’ internal organization (Milgrom 1988).
But entrepreneurs grasping rights is a much wider concept than the concept of rent-seeking.  Any attempts to
capture rights that are in the public domain (Barzel 1997) may thus be seen as manifestations of
entrepreneurial alertness.
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possibly spanning several stages of production. In fact, to focus our discussion, we shall
focus on exactly this kind of experimentation.
Experimenting with running a production system is only needed if there is uncertainty with
respect to the best way of operating technically interdependent production systems. In the
world portrayed by the neoclassical theory of production, this is not fundamentally a
problem: Everything is laid out in the book of blueprints; thus, experimentation is not
necessary (Nelson and Winter 1982). However, as the Austrians emphasize production
technologies are not just given: They have to be discovered, and often discovered anew, for
example, when unanticipated changes in preferences, technology and regulation make a
change of the firm’s capital strcuture necessary (Lachmann 1956). In this sort of
experimenting with heterogeneous production technologies, we find a key function of the
entrepreneur.  As Lachmann (1956: 13, 16) stressed,
… We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combinations
… will be ever changing, will be dis-solved and re-formed.  In this activity, we
find the real function of the entrepreneur.
[T]he entrepreneur’s function … is to specify and make decisions on the
concrete form the capital resources shall have. He specifies and modifies the
layout of his plant ... As long as we disregard the heterogeneity of capital, the
true function of the entrepreneur must also remain hidden. In a homogenous
world there is no scope for the activity of specifying.
We agree fully with Lachmann’s points that interdependencies between assets are important
for understanding the problem of organization, that unexpected contingencies upset existing
combinations, that the entrepreneur task is to coordinate the uses of assets, and that most of
the attendant problems would be trivialized in a homogeneous world.12  In the terminology
used here, a homogeneous world would be one in which the assignment of use rights to
assets would be trivialized.  Since all assets would be (perfect) substitutes, there would be
no problem of managed coordination, although there might be problems of moral hazard
related to the use of assets, requiring some monitoring.  In this world, it would be hard to
discriminate between firms and markets.
                                                
12
 By a “homogenous world”, Lachmann means one where assets are only substitutes, not complements, and,
furthermore, that all capital assets (save perhaps for human capital) are perfect substitutes.
11
Specialization and Property Rights
As Adam Smith pointed in The Wealth of Nations, specialization in production is a source of
productivity improvements.  Specifically, he ascribes productivity gains to improvements in
a worker’s ability to perform a task as it is repeated more often, the time that is saved from
avoiding having to switch from one task to another, and an improved ability of workers to
identity labor saving innovations.  At least the first and third advantages of the division of
labour are related to improvements in knowledge.  Thus, the discovery of new knowledge is
aided by the division of labor (Richardson 1975). In fact, as Brian Loasby (1995: 302) has
argued:
…the division of labour is to be thought of, not as a model of the efficient
allocation of a given array of skills, but as a method of fostering the
development of skills, and indeed generating other kinds of knowledge.  It is a
discovery process”.
Many of the labor saving innovations envisaged by Adam Smith are results of workers’
experiments with their own tasks in their own “circumstances of time and place” (Hayek
1945).  In our perspective, the extent of this experimentation depends on the allocation of
property rights – notably use rights – inside the firm.  Thus, there is a connection between
discovery and learning on the one hand and the allocation of use rights on the other hand.
This connection is a consequence of the fact that learning and discovery will often require
the exercise of use rights over assets.  Patterns of learning depend on the allocation of use
rights between different individuals over time and specialization in production may be one
reason for reallocation of use rights. Thus, specialization in production can be tied to the
possession of use rights to the extent that we interpret specialization as reflecting a
subdivision of use rights over assets.13
This implies that the extent of experimentation depends on how well-specified and easily
monitored use rights are, since the more well specified they are, the less able are those who
use assets to experiment and the more constrained will their experimentation and discovery
be.14  Discretion may thus enable individuals to learn a broader set of skills and to conduct
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 So that each individual holds rights over a more narrow set of assets or holds a more narrow set of rights
over the same assets.
14
 If, for example, the manner in which a computer operator runs a program is pre-specified in a contract and
easily monitored, his learning by doing may be limited to improving the speed with which he activates the
12
experiments which may result in innovations.  In this sense, there is a direct link between
property rights and possibilities of discovery.
Coordination and Property Rights
So far we have told a rosy story inspired by both Smith and Hayek in which the
discretionary behavior of local agents result in productivity gains.  However, discretionary
behavior may not always result in such gains.  First, if the discretionary behavior takes place
inside a firm, shirking or other ways of appropriating a greater part of the value from the use
of an asset are possible instances of discretionary behavior.15  Thus, there is a clear trade-off
here between local innovativeness and the provision of incentives (Jensen and Meckling
1992).  The allocation of residual income rights from the use of an asset can be a powerful
mean of reducing shirking.
Second, discretionary behavior may give rise to problems if strong technological
interdependencies are involved.16 In this case, discretionary behavior may result in
bottlenecks or in uneven development of components. From our perspective, these
seemingly technological problems can in actuality be ascribed to imperfectly specified rights
over assets as production tasks are subdivided.  This is because it is difficult to specify all
valued dimensions of assets prior to specialization, since many of the valued dimensions of
assets only become apparent from experimenting with the uses of assets and discovering the
best uses of those assets.17 However, given a great deal of interdependence in a complex
system, the best time and place to use an asset depend on the specification of the uses of all
other assets that are needed in production.
                                                                                                                                                     
keyboard.  If he has greater discretion in deciding how to operate the program, he might have a greater
opportunity for learning by experimenting.
15
 In Leijonhufvud’s (1986) story, the interdependencies that characterize the division of labour also introduce
the possibility of hold-up (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Williamson 1985).  We neglect this
possibility here.
16
  See Milgrom and Roberts (1992: chapter 4).  The concept of “complementarities” in the modern economics
of organization (idem.; Hart 1995) covers much of what we mean by interdependencies.
(Complementarities/interdependencies were also much emphasized in Austrian capital theory, e.g., Lachmann
1956).  However, in contrast to the modern economics of organization, we emphasize coordination rather
than hold-up problems and the like.
17
 Even if important dimensions can in fact be specified, it may be difficult to allocate these rights in ways that
ensure the best use of assets.  This may, for example, be the case with the time and place dimension of assets
where non-optimal allocations result in excess stocks of intermediate products or in idle assets.
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This creates costs of specialization due to unsolved coordination problems, that is, problems
of making agents’ plans mesh (Hayek 1937; Malmgren 1961).  In firms, such coordination
problems emerge as, for example, problems of bottlenecks. These are problems where
complexity and interdependent activities make it difficult to specify how best to sequence
various activities, or where the introduction of more specialized tools and equipment creates
capacity utilization problems due to technical indivisibilities, or where innovations in
individual activities result in an uneven development of tools, equipment and components.
Basically these problems arise when those who deliver parts or carry out activities are not
aware of the need for mutual adjustment, or do not have the incentive to make their
activities mesh with those of others.
Solving problems that arise from technological interdependencies is an important souse of
innovative improvements (Rosenberg 1976; Sahal 1981).  However, such innovations do not
emerge because of increased specialization, but because of learning in coordination.  The
question then arises: what governance structure best provides for experimentation and
accumulation of experience in coordination?  We shall follow basic Coasian arguments
(Coase 1937, 1991), and stress that one of the reasons why managed coordination may be
advantageous relative to price coordination is because the former reduces costs of learning
about the coordination of technological interdependent tasks.  We try to explicate such a
view in the following.
Experimenting and Learning: the Role of Management
Virtually all contributors to the theory of the firm (Langlois 1992) being one exception) take
the costs of coordinating various tasks, as well as the extent of specialization in the economy,
as given.  However, the cost of coordination of tasks may crucially depend on the degree of
specialization. Self-management of more tasks may be an alternative to specialization that
reduces overall costs of production in cases where coordination between many specialized and
interdependent tasks proves costly. The degree of specialization therefore depends on the
marginal costs of coordinating increasingly specialized tasks and the marginal benefits from
specialization.
It is in the handling of some of the coordination problems associated with  interdependencies
between tasks that we may find a rationale of the firm.  Specifically, firms can be viewed as
solutions to problems of coordination in situations where use rights over assets cannot be
14
perfectly specified and allocated in manners which ensures the functionality of complex
technologies.  Such situations may occur because agents have only limited computational
capacity (Williamson 1985), making it to difficult for them to specify use rights in ways that
solve problems of interdependencies. Or they may occur because agents face uncertainty in
the sense that they lack ability to imagine “... the alternatives between which decisions are
made” (Littlechild 1986: 29).
This kind of uncertainty (which characterizes the radical subjectivist market model) has
typically been attributed to the possibility of inventions that change the set of alternatives
between which economic agent can choose and thus also the structure of (shadow) prices.
However, uncertainty in a non-probabilistic sense is also associated with much experimental
activity.  In the context of firm activity, experiments take place in the form of the many trials
and errors involved with setting up a smoothly running production system which consist of
many interdependent specialized tasks.  Of course, such experimentation is only needed if
there is uncertainty with respect to the best way of operating technically interdependent
production systems.  Due to such technological uncertainty, firms may start different kinds
of experiments and follow different paths of learning.
The firm provides a low cost way of discovering solutions to coordination problems related
to bottlenecks and uneven development of components.  For managed direction of resources
to be efficient, it is required that entrepreneurs are at least as qualified in discovering the
relevant prices (that is, finding the highest valued uses of assets) as independent contractors
would be.18 Otherwise, costs of transacting may be saved at the expense of efficiency in the
use of resources. If entrepreneurs are better able to determine the valuable uses of resources
compared to other agents, entrepreneurs have a ownership advantage over resources.   Such
an advantage explains the single person firm, but not necessarily why entrepreneurs hire
employees who are prepared to take orders within certain limits in order to take advantage of
                                                
18
 Coase (1937) mentions “..increasing opportunity costs due to the failure of entrepreneurs to make the best
use of the factor of production” (p.23) as one of the factors which set a limit to the efficient size of a firm. He
also assumes that “..the costs of losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in the spatial
distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the probability of
changes in the relevant prices. As more transactions are organized by an entrepreneur, it would appear that
the transactions would tend to be either different in kind or in different places” (p.25). Managers, in other
words, have limited capacity to “discover the relevant prices” and this increases mistakes as more and more
dissimilar transactions are organized in a firm.
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this knowledge. Entrepreneurs could as well rent the labor time of an agent in return for the
exercise of a certain well specified task.
However, in actuality, entrepreneurs stand a good chance of acquiring superior knowledge
about the best uses of the assets that make up a complex technology. From the innovation
literature, it is apparent that the solution to problems of bottlenecks and uneven development
in components are based on learning by doing in production and development (Rosenberg
1976; Sahal 1981). The argument here is that this experience from learning by doing is
probably more easily accumulated within the boundaries of firms. One of the reasons why
one might expect this learning to be less costly within the boundaries of firms may be that
entrepreneurs who hold residual rights over assets -- including rights to re-define and
reallocate specific rights -- are able to conduct experiments. They can do this without
continuously having to re-negotiate contracts (which will have more or less unforeseen
outcomes because of the uncertain nature of the experimental process). This saves all sorts
of costs related to time, bargaining and contract drafting.19
Entrepreneurs are then able to create “controlled” experiments in which they only change
some aspects of the tasks in order to trace the effects of some specific re-arrangements of
rights. Setting up a controlled experiment may be more difficult across the boundaries of
firms, particularly when interdependencies exists between firms and if it is difficult to
specify all the tasks which must and must not be changed. Coordinating interdependent tasks
within the boundaries of a firm may provide entrepreneurs with a more complete picture of
the nature of interdependencies. Such information is not only important in relation to
eliminating bottlenecks, but also in relation to avoiding problems of uneven development of
components by setting up interface standards and other more permanent solutions.
So far, the argument has been that relative to markets, firms may economize on the
transaction costs of learning the best way of coordinating technological interdependent
systems.  Now, once a firm has discovered how to coordinate some specialized tasks, there
would be little advantage from managed direction relative to market transacting, and
coordination by order contracts would substitute for coordination by management.20
                                                
19
 In this connection wage contracts may be an efficient way of sharing risks from experimenting.
20
 Managed direction could still be advantageous in cases where adaptation of interdependent production
systems to unforseen contingences were called for.
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However, such specialization between firms would give way to economic gains from further
specialization in tasks, and this in turn would create new uncertainty and new opportunities
for reducing coordination costs by experimenting. In other words, there will be an ongoing
process of specialization in tasks, learning in coordination and specialization between firms
and new ways of coordination will continuously be imagined by entrepreneurs, much like
the process of cumulative causation envisaged by Allyn Young (1928).  Thus, firms contain
many mechanisms that endogenously produce change, such as the (related) mechanisms of
ongoing learning, experimenting, and changes in the division of labor. Therefore, while
there may be optimal time paths of firm growth, our reasoning would indicate that it is
doubtful whether there is an optimum size of the firm (cf. also Penrose 1959).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have brought Austrian ideas to bear on the theory of the firm.  In particular,
we have argued that it is possible to arrive at an experimental view of the firm from broadly
Austrian principles.  Thus, the experimental view of the firm developed here stresses the role
of the firm as a repository for a broad range of experiments, mostly with production
technology.   It is a view that stresses the role of discovery and learning. However,
experimental activities are in general costly, and are particularly to be so when
experimentation with strongly interdependent technologies is involved. The costs of
coordinating such technologies may be reduced by bringing them in-house. This explains the
existence of the firm from an experimental point of view.
The story we have tried to tell in this paper is broadly consistent with much of the modern
economics of organization.  Thus, we have borrowed ideas from the property rights literature
(e.g., Barzel 1997), and have applied these ideas to settings involving complementarities
between assets and activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Hart 1995).  However, we have
given these ideas distinctively Austrian and radical subjectivist interpretations, first, by
stressing the experimental nature of economic activity, second, by arguing that a primary task
of the entrepreneur/manager is to conduct controlled experiments with interdependent
production technologies, and, third, by stressing that the goal of these experiments is to
achieve internal plan consistency (i.e., make the production process run smoothly).  Clearly, all
this can be taken further.  For example, entrepreneurs also initiate experiments in order to
launch new products that in turn may be tested in the experimental procedure of the market
17
process.  However, our main aim in this paper has been to suggest that Austrian and radical
subjectivist ideas mesh with important insights in mainstream economics, and that new
insights emerge from combining these bodies of theory.
18
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